In the post-political period, the Kurdish-led HDP has offered a radical democratic political project by adopting a left-leaning populism to challenge the political establishment (elites) through the construction of a new concept of 'the People' (underdog) in a new political grammar. This article outlines the feasibility of applying Laclau's populist discursive in analysing the notion of radical democracy, which is conceptualised in terms of Mouffe's agonistic approach, as a 'real' alternative in the organic crisis of the 'new Turkey'. The inclusive populism of the HDP mobilises the collective passion in politics, with its common affects, in order to create a counterhegemonic bloc. This left-wing populist ontology aims to reform the existing democratic institutions in terms of an egalitarian and libertarian rhetoric to challenge the AKP's right-wing conservative populism that has recently transformed into authoritarianism, majoritarianism and illiberalism in the post-democracy era.
Introduction
In the so-called populist zeitgeist 1 a new form of politics arose out of the global 'assembly' or 'square' movements, such as the occupy movement, anti-austerity groups (e.g. Spanish Indignados, Greek Aganaktismenoi) and the Arab spring, while at the same time right-wing populist parties were gaining the support of mass constituencies. The People's Democracy Party (HDP) 2 People', achieving the consent of a significant section of society and building 'the People' into its discourse of neoliberal conservative democracy. However, the party shifted dramatically after consolidating its hegemonic power. First the AKP become a centre-right party by embracing the classic structure of the state, although the party as a populist party had previously struggled against the establishment in a counterhegemonic move. Then the AKP transformed itself into a conservative nationalist party by embracing a rigid statist approach and setting boundaries around what was meant by 'the People' by excluding various different identities in society who as floating signifiers (voters) saw this new signifier as an opportunity for their democratic demands.
The country's politics was reformed in terms of the state's securitisation policy and a monocultural understanding of citizenship as shaped by the AKP's current conservative nationalism, authoritarian populism, majoritarianism and illiberal democracy 4 in what the AKP administration fondly refer to as the 'new Turkey' (neo-Ottomanism). This culminated in the April 2017 referendum and the march towards the crossroads of a historical transition 5 when the electorate voted 51% in favour of 'Yes'. It approved the transfer of power from a parliamentary democracy to an executive presidency, despite the fact that the Higher Election Committee (YSK) broke electoral rules with last-minute changes allowing unstamped ballots (in favour of the 'Yes' vote) to be counted. With the existence of a state of emergency and widespread crackdown on the opposition, the Presidential election became the last of a number of socio-political scandals that led the AKP to lose the consent of half of the electorate. The lack of strong opposition political parties and their inability to acknowledge the diverse collective identities within society, particularly the main opposition Republican People's Party's (CHP) which because of its statist and nationalist character could not mediate between the state and society, led to calls for an alternative politics.
Both the neoliberal Islamist AKP and the secular Kemalist CHP have an implicit agreement as to the definition of Turkish nationalism that embraces a state-led and top-down consensus and logic of unitarianism (one nation, one language, etc.), which excludes the collective identities of 'others' (such as Kurds, Alevis, Christians, leftists, and LGBTs) from representative politics. These mainstream political actors have established a state-centric hegemony based on a monist ideology that has undermined egalitarian and emancipatory democratic principles by neutralising the centrality of antagonism in politics. As elements of the establishment they cannot offer any alternative solutions to the social discontent within society and, therefore, from the point of view of the underdog these elites are little different from each other in how they see the world and in their narrow definition of 'the People' 6 due to their uniform and nationalist understanding of citizenship. The HDP rejected this post-political system by offering a radical plural democratic political project that advocated a leftwing inclusive populism. 7 This critical discourse challenged the political establishment (the elites) by constructing the idea of the demos (or underdog) as a nodal point in terms of agonistic pluralism (the legitimacy of many different identities in a conflictual consensus) and popular sovereignty.
This article outlines the feasibility of applying Laclau's theoretical perspective on populism 8 to the HDP's left-leaning popular politics within the discursive approach of the Essex School 9 in order to analyse the discourse of radical democracy from an ontological rather than ontic perspective. 10 This radical restoration project is conceptualised in terms of Mouffe's radical democracy theory 11 that embraces an agonistic approach 12 as a 'real' alternative and narrative to the organic crisis in the 'new Turkey'. The paper is divided three-fold by taking the June 2015 election as a watershed. First, the paper argues the HDP was formed as an alternative to recapture politics from the archaic political practices that had been in place since the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 by promoting an inclusive left-leaning populism-a new political grammar and politics of hope in the pre-June 2015 period. Secondly, it examines the HDP's radical plural democratic imagining that has been shaped by an agonistic bloc comprising many different groups through the mobilisation of a collective political passion with common affects that witnessed a popularity until the end of the snap election in November 2015.
Finally, the paper evaluates the current post-democracy era as the rise of political tension after the failed peace process with the Kurds and the subsequent renewal of armed conflict along with the failed coup attempt by the global Gülen Islamist movement which the government labelled as the 'Fettullahist Terrorist Organisation' (FETO). This recent period of politics is shaped by the consolidation of political forces (the AKP, CHP, and Nationalist Movement Party-MHP) thorough pragmatic negotiations that has caused the end of politics by hindering the mechanism of democratic politics and its institutions. The post-democracy has been fostered by the AKP's authoritarian 13 because the centre parties (the AKP and CHP) had been unresponsive to the democratic demands of these disadvantage groups with little appreciation of pluralism. Moreover, these established actors understood the notion of 'the People' as 'one nation'. Therefore, the many 17 felt that they had a vote but no voice and as a result employed different channels, such as street protest, to express themselves in order to gain inclusion, fairness, and empowerment. This condition allowed the rise of the HDP's counter-populism amongst the diverse anti-AKP/Erdoğan groups (as the 'many') who came together at Taksim Square during the Gezi protest and used various social forums and social media like Facebook and Twitter, along with various digital technologies (for example, Çapul TV and You Tube), to discuss participatory democratic alternatives in their everyday life. The internet, especially social media, generated a new type of campaigning allowing for an interaction between Gezi and the HDP (in particular with the co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş). 18 The horizontal layer of political engagement of the 'many' (or biopolitical multitude) with the vertical politics of the party, as the party alone would be an inadequate mechanism for hegemonic articulation, constituted a popular unity. This coalition of civil and political society provided the historical preconditions to enable the HDP to become a 'voice of the voiceless' in the parliamentary system. The party leadership used the 'we are going to the parliament' discourse to express the will of the people since those who did not support the AKP were excluded from the national sphere. These 'otherised' were depicted as 'internal threats', 'separatists', or 'pro-Western' and were seen to threaten the 'national will'. Therefore, they saw the HDP's minoritarian 19 populism as an opportunity that articulated the plurality of democratic demands and collective political passion. The HDP's left-leaning populism as a new form of politics played a central role in the formation of a collective political identity and response to the social and political crisis arising from the AKP's dominant discourse.
According to Laclau's discursive theoretical analysis, populism is predicated upon a hegemonic relationship between two blocs as a political logic that can emerge in various forms as a way of doing politics. 20 The HDP's populist discourse matches Laclau's ideas on fabricating 'the People' which draws a new political frontier that offers a chain of equivalence in terms of both a horizontal and vertical pluralism among the logic of differences while creating an unorthodox political grammar as a signifier of a deeply polarised society. 21 In the HDP's radical vision, the public space is constituted as the symbolic democratic ground of a coalition of progressive groups where disagreement and opposition take place and conflict stays in the centre of an internal hegemonic contestation. Therefore, the HDP's popular discursive started at the point in 2013 when the 'many' (floating signifier/undecided voters) sought an alternative to the ideology of the state's hegemonic bloc and where there was a debate as to whether the HDP's populism could create a politics of hope as an alternative to an apocalyptic future. This egalitarian and emancipatory populism was a fruitful strategy for the development of democratic politics, as well as challenging the obscurantist right-wing populism that could be considered as a threat to such democracy. The wider inclusive populism of the HDP embraced leftist values by redefining the political frontier as the dichotomy between 'us' (progressive groups, the underdog, others or minorities) and 'them' (far-right nationalists, elitists, political Islamists and the majority). This left-leaning populist moment, with its reference to 'we are', 22 refused to accept the archaic friend/enemy (we/they) duality which had been formed in the historic antagonisms of ethnic Kurds and Turks and of religious piety and secularism, especially after their historic success in the June 2015 election.
The HDP's politics of hope to construct 'the People' as a discursive nodal point was based on a dichotomy between the establishment and the underdog. This initiative deconstructed the structures of politics by using both the political party as a vertical politics and social movements as a horizontal politics. The HDP's democratic politics was structurally open and contingent where the party distinctively built a common sense as a counterhegemonic culture.
Furthermore, the party directed the dynamics of social movements into the representative participatory politics so that they could be heard within the parliamentary system; otherwise in the long term the collective political passion would have gradually disappeared once the activism of civil disobedience, for example Taksim Square, was abandoned. Accordingly, the party governance synergised with the social movements (e.g. feminists, ecologists, antiestablished and anti-capitalist Muslims) and engaged with the demands of these adversarial protests particularly between 2013 and 2015. At the same time, it synchronised with leftist forces, such as the Revolutionist Socialist Workers Party (DSIP) and the pro-Kurdish political parties (the Democratic Regions Party-DBP), to combine the horizontal and vertical political energy under the same roof. This populist momentum provided a surface for the logic of equivalences among popular democratic interpellations, as the HDP as an empty signifier was signified by the plurality of socio-political demands for a popular will. Hence the party manifesto placed a strong emphasis on equal rights, social security (such as unemployment and the minimum wage), solidarity (for example, a basic package of free water and electricity), free healthcare, and education. 23 Laclau identified populism (eschewing a debate on the definition of populism 24 ) not as an ideology, regime or programme, or a narrow style political movement but as a strategy for hegemonic struggle and a dimension of politics concerned with the mobilisation of the underdog within a new political frontier (us/them) which is compatible with different forms of government. In this context, the HDP's discursive populism gained a positive connotation for the left in the discourse of power for the people, as opposed to the populism espoused by rightwing political parties that carried a pejorative undertone of demagogy to those on the left. This politics of hope as a revolt against the status quo in the name of the people was appreciated by the voters who gave the HDP sufficient power in the June 2015 general election to overcome the ten-percentage threshold required for parliamentary representation. 25 In this achievement, the role of Demirtaş was vital as a charismatic leader and new challenger. Demirtaş did not belong to the established elite and represented the demands of the marginalised and became a spokesperson for the 'ignored'. His populism provided him with an image of a national leader representing a positive approach, who in the presidential election of August 2014 won 9.8% of the popular vote against Erdoğan's campaign 26 with the slogan 'we will not make you president'.
The HDP's left-leaning (inclusive, pluralist and emancipatory) populism can be contrasted with the AKP's right-wing (exclusive, monist and authoritarian) articulation of it and is clearly distinguishable by the nature of their definitions of 'the People' (citizenship), democracy and secularism, although they share similarities in the way they deploy the core concepts of populism to reach hegemony. The HDP populist bloc was assembled out of the new social movements and 'progressive Kurdish nationalism' through a re-signification of floating signifiers and by exposing the right-wing AKP's populist hegemony as a neoliberal understanding of a rational 'total consensus' that ostracised others. The AKP had also moralised politics in terms of a national will signified by Turkishness and Islamic values instead of a contest between ideologies (left and right). As a result, the HDP's inclusive populism mobilised the collective political passion (around issues such as recognition of the Alevi cemevi ceremony, 27 Kurdish education, LGBT marriage equality, etc.) in a populist mood, with its common affects, in order to create a new demoi or radical citizenship. 28 Hence, this left-inspired populist ontology aimed to reform the existing democratic institutions in terms of a model of radical democracy-what I term 'another Turkey'-within an hegemonic rhetoric articulated in terms of 'old Turkey' and 'new Turkey'. The party's critical discourse, such as 'great humanity', had become a very important strategy in constructing a collective will that could challenge the AKP's neoliberal, and more recently, authoritarian and majoritarian right-wing conservative populism.
A transient radical plural democratic project in agonistic public space
Hegemony is always in the process of being articulated and is never final or ended, thus democratic politics formed in this power struggle is structurally open and contingent. We have already witnessed how the HDP's left-leaning populism practiced and represented a power struggle and an effective strategy in achieving a radical plural democratic project. The radical democratic approach criticises the liberal one with its notion of total consensus, an approach which the AKP attempted to apply through promoting the modern millet system 29 in a post-Ottoman society or, in the case of the Kurds, the 'national will and brotherhood project' that aimed at protecting the nation's integrity. However, there is no consensus without exclusion, hence no possibility of complete inclusion. The HDP's aim was to take account of this fact about collective representation by formulating a new political model that expanded the sociopolitical space to create a new type of society. The radically democratic interpellation of the HDP was constituted in an agonistic debate. This Laclauian and Mouffeian theoretical approach to radical democracy with its new political grammar 30 presented a challenge and, for a short moment, a radical democratisation of the conservative democracy at a time when the country (including some of the left and Kemalists) had come to accept the idea there was no alternative to the AKP's hegemonic right-wing populism. In spite of that, the party's manifesto, its discourse, leaders' speeches, strategies and membership presented the possibility of a deepening and widening democracy, one formed in terms of an agonistic model quite different from the model offered by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The latter's approach has much more in common with that of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as well as the other post-operaists, such as Paolo Virno, 31 who advocate an exodus strategy which suggests presenting democracy instead of representing democracy by 'withdrawal from' the existing democratic institutions in terms of the radical democracy theoretical debate.
There have been some important milestones in the trajectory of Kurdish political history since the late 1990s, namely Turkey's EU proposed accession and the Kurdish internal democratisation process. The most important change was the shift towards the idea, during the early 2000s, of how an 'independent Kurdish state' could become a radical democracy that conceptualised in a discourse of democratic autonomy, republic or confederalism as offered by the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan was inspired by Gramsci and more importantly by Murray Bookchin's notion of an anarchist municipality. 32 The PKK's 'independent territory' discourse shifted into the idea of self-determination or absolute democracy that had already been implemented by the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) canton regime in the Rojava region (northern Syria) during the on-going conflict with the Islamic State (IS/DAESH). After the PYD's success with its own 'multitude' in the Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons, the PKK wished to employ this strategy in Turkey by seeking a democratic autonomy that would mean an exodus from the system and withdrawal from the existing state institutions in order to create a regional democracy. As a result, the PKK created a 'revolutionist people's war' in the Kurdish dominated cities (i.e. Sur, Cizre, and Nusaybin) by using trenches and barricades as a new form of war against the state security forces while the Kurdistan Community Union (KCK) had already been established to provide an alternative political governance.
The HDP, on the other hand, preferred to adopt parliamentary politics in an engagement with (to use the Mouffeian term), that is a confrontation with, the existing democratic institutions using what Gramsci would call a 'war of position' strategy seeking a neutralisation of hegemony as a passive revolution. This was to be accomplished through articulating a leftleaning populism within the Turkish nation state in order to radically shift the regime. This was also a strategy for the reformation of the existing democratic institutions to enact constitutional rights to guarantee the democratic demands of the collective political passion around such issues as identity, culture, religion and language. The HDP did not reject the system nor did it operate politically through non-representative channels (such as the serhıldan-the Kurdish intifada) outside of the representative sphere (e.g. Parliament) for democratic demands. Rather it engaged with existing democratic institutions in order to renovate and reinvigorate them within a leftist political discourse and political economy for the masses, not only for certain groups. 33 Therefore, the HDP's discursive logic and left-leaning populism became a vital apparatus in order to gain hegemonic power to transform the politics and social fabric of Turkey and hence radically recast its conservative democracy.
The HDP's radical plural democratic bloc has relied on two main political traditions along with fifty-per cent female participation. The East (regional) side is an alliance of 'progressive the Rights and Freedom Party (HAK-PAR). In this way, the HDP has rejected a reductionist conception of politics and, therefore, has gone beyond the regional dimension of Kurdish politics through the discursive tools of 'Turkeyfication' and 'new life' by stitching together different social and political formations of society. We might see this in terms of a Wittgensteinian 'family resemblance' 34 in which discursive practices provide affection and desire for a collective identity as a sort of 'language game'. 35 The HDP has constructed a discursive struggle in diversity with the idea of the 'we are' 36 as a collective will. The party has offered an alternative democratic solution to the socio-political crisis. Within this agonistic approach, the public space is constituted in a radical plural way where the conflict arising from the disagreement and opposition that takes place in Turkey's multiplicitous and polarised society is brought to the centre of democratic politics. This is quite different from the liberal understanding of conflict resolution that is based on moral values rather than a political philosophy. The party first started to practice this constructive conflict approach within its own alliances bringing together religious, secular, modernist, and traditionalist groups as can be seen amongst its own MPs, such as the Kurdish Islamist Altan Tan, the Turkish leftist Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the Armenian Garo Paylan, and the Syrian Orthodox Erol Dora. There is no complete agreement within this coalition and therefore there is a conflict.
Agonistic pluralism means there is no attempt at the ultimate reconciliation of these political antagonisms, instead the aim is to tame them and to recast adversaries as 'friendly enemies'.
The HDP's common symbolic democratic ground, based on the principles of equality and liberty for all, has provided this agonistic space where all differences can live together and respect each other as a small 'we'. 37 All those in the alliance have agreed on these ethicopolitical principles whilst struggling with each other over their interpretation and scope in a Mouffeian oxymoron of 'conflictual consensus'. It is also their aim to apply this constructive role of conflict to the country's macro politics to build a larger 'WE' in an agonistic debate, such as was practiced during the ceasefire and the peace building process between the state and the PKK in the 'Wise People' initiative between 2013 and 2015. This can be seen as a good example of agonistic negotiation in line with the HDP's own political imagination.
The 'Wise People' committee consisted of various well-respected intellectuals, journalists, and artists who sought to inform the public about the conflict resolution process and to further a deeper understanding of the trauma that conflict was causing both to Kurdish and Turkish societies. This 'Wise People' social enterprise endeavoured to build a common ground for creating sympathy, forgiveness and consultation between the stakeholders of the armed conflict. They widely exposed a political passion for a resolution of the conflict as expressed, for instance, in the slogan 'let's not allow any mother to cry again' and in the organisation of the 'peace and fraternity' picnic to foster solidarity. The democratic demands included the request that Kurdish national demands were not criminalised and demonised through political moralisation and securitisation and that the Kurds were not seen as an enemy or threat that needed to be destroyed. Politics was not to be pushed along an anti-democratic path by, on the one hand, referring to the PKK and Öcalan as 'terrorists', 'baby killers' and 'separatists', and, on the other, by referring to the government as 'cruel', 'colonisers', and 'unjust'. According to the Mouffeian agonistic approach if politics is governed by moralisation in terms of ethnic or religious principles then opponents can only be seen as an 'evil' who need to be eliminated.
When ethnic/religious identities are used to denote a collective identity, it is difficult to operate a democratic politics due to these identities being seen as sacred and non-negotiable.
This new political culture also raises the question of whether 'another Turkey' is possible?
In this respect, the HDP's struggle for hegemony is bound up not only with their own interests but also the interests of other democratic groups in a politicisation of politics and chain of equivalence alongside the Kurds. For those people who are dissatisfied with politics there is little difference between the centre-right AKP and the centre-left or secular CHP, for as Mouffe might say it is like the difference between Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola. Therefore, they feel that nothing really changes in the foundation of politics to provide a 'real choice' and a meaningful representation. By promoting a different model of Turkey, the HDP has become a 'constitutive outside(r)', in the Derridian sense, 38 
authoritarianism, and majoritarianism
In the current period, the country's politics can be characterised as Turkish Islamist with a declining democracy, parliamentary deadlock, economic stagnation, social polarisation, a stalling of the EU accession process, and intense violence, all of which can be identified as the end of politics. After the country was hit by violent unrest as a result of armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK when the two-years peace process collapsed, along with the failed coup attempt in July 2016 by Gülenists, 40 the country's political life moved into a postdemocratic era. This regressive period has witnessed a mixture of the moralisation of politics (the de-politicisation of politics), the de-democratisation of institutions (for example, the legal system), the securitisation of democratic demands (with the suppression of human rights, individual liberty, etc.) and a state of emergency supported though an illiberal and majoritarian ballot box democracy where different ideologies can no longer confront each other. It is a paradox of democracy, as the recent Presidential referendum shows clearly, that the government's counter-coup, to use a term from Balibar, has crushed democracy and individual liberties 41 because it defines democracy only as the will of the majority through elections and electoral advantage. Elections no longer offer different options, rather they have become a tool to securitise and stabilise the power of political parties. Since the incumbent AKP has become a domino and not an egemonia by using coercion without having the consent of the whole society, its legitimacy has been severely tarnished in the last few years on key issue such as the freedom of the press, corruption, foreign policy, and the civilian deaths of the Academics for Peace. 42 As a result, many members of society are alienated and have become neglected citizens as their identities cannot find a place in the new Turkey's public space.
Like Syriza's political imagination in Greece that challenged the unelected troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the HDP's alternative political project has not had a fairy-tale ending. It was interrupted by the escalating violence and turmoil in the wake of the June 2015 election, followed by the November 2015's renewal election, as well as a crackdown resulting from the state of emergency that came into place after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. The optimism of political hope has instead resulted in the end of politics for, as Gramsci states, 'the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born'. 43 The shortlived agonistic adversary politics has again been turned into the antagonistic enemy relations which were supposed to have ended. The struggle is no longer agonistic and there is no more agonistic debate with the ending of the peace process (e.g. the 'Wise People' initiative has stopped). HDP buildings have been burned down by ultra-nationalist mobs and rallies targeted by suicide bombers-allegedly organised by IS, but the government has also been accused of accommodating them-which ended in hundreds of casualties in Diyarbakır, Suruç, and Ankara. At the same time the PKK-affiliated groups have begun an urban war in the region with suicide bombings in the western metropolises of Istanbul and Ankara.
In conclusion, the current tension created by nationalism and the securitisation of politics constitutes a post-democratic era in re-initiating the armed struggle, the escalation of violence and suicide attacks. 44 Moreover, the rise of authoritarian, nationalist and oppressive policies has triggered a politics of fear and deep social division. The AKP leadership has launched a strategy that destabilises salient democratic institutions, including the media, the judiciary, local authorities, and the education establishment, the separation of power and human rights conventions. The party leadership has heavily employed coercion in the ongoing state of emergency, using the law to oppress the opposition, hence eliminating them from the public sphere and representative politics within a new violent antagonism. With little effective opposition from the other political parties, especially the CHP, the HDP's radical reformism has been criminalised, terrorised and neutralised, reducing it to a zombie category. The HDP's elected party co-leaders, Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and significant numbers of MPs and almost 100 mayors have been arrested and required to defend themselves against charges of 'being a member of an armed terrorist organisation'. The HDP is in a defensive position because its main task is no longer that of radicalising the conservative democracy of the AKP but simply to protect the democratic institutions. It is very hard to articulate the ideas of inclusive pluralism and peace after this political project has been hijacked making it very difficult for the HDP to keep its legitimacy among the Turkish and Kurdish audience.
The Kurds are, on the other hand, upset with the HDP for not giving sufficient support to the people in the region during the government's urban operations against the PKK's urban-based youth armed group, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H), 45 with much damage done to historical cities which have suffered endless curfews along with the human tragedy of thousands of internal displacements. Although the HDP has called on the PKK for a cease-fire, it has hardly pushed the AKP government, the state apparatus and the society for a new attempt at peace building. The heavy state of emergency regulations leaves political life hostage to other authoritarian policies within which the HDP is unable to pursue its radical plural democratic political imagination. The passive struggle it is engaged in aims to keep challenging the crackdown launched by the government and criticises the reduction of politics to a narrow practice of ethnic and religious identities as well as the securitisation, criminalising and terrorising of democratic popular interests.
The AKP's conservative nationalism based on illiberal principles and authoritarian institutional politics that celebrates Islamic and Turkish values has become a threat to a plural and participatory democracy. 46 A clear distinction must be made on the one hand between progressive democratic groups such as the HDP and on the other the Gülenists who share a similar collective identity with the pro-AKP groups and who in the recent turmoil sought to govern via undemocratic channels. But despite all the social and political crises (including the closing of media outlets) the AKP still enjoys considerable electoral support which cannot be explained purely by coercion, but also through economics and ideology. However, this authoritarian neoliberal new Turkey is a country with journalists imprisoned and a large number of political prisoners, an opposition silenced, and thousands of civil servants dismissed from their jobs. Lately, 'the People' have been (re)constructed narrowly by the politics of the AKP who desire more ideological comfort (a neoliberal economy and Islamic conservatism combined with Turkish nationalism) and economic stability rather than a widening and deepening democracy, justice, equality, liberty or in a broad way integration into the EU.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the HDP as an underdog movement has constructed 'the People' June election. The hegemonic power struggle has been redefined during the recent postdemocracy era with the current politics requiring a new public sphere of representation and the definition of a new type of citizenship through the development of a new political frontier in order to go back to 'the political' again as there can be no democratic politics without political frontiers and antagonism to solve the democratic dilemma of the country. At the moment, the country's politics is limited, and this has led the HDP to concern itself with protecting the existing democratic institutions, in what Spinoza remarks 'there is neither hope without fear, nor fear without hope'. 47 Therefore, the party is apprehensive about its own legitimacy rather than radically democratising the democracy in terms of a leftist egalitarian and libertarian populist discourse.
Notes

